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The main goals of monetary policy, the stability of general price level 
and keeping the monetary expansion in line with the long term output 
potential of the economy, can be met by utilizing direct controls or 
market oriented monetary instruments. Nowadays sophisticated market 
oriented procedures are mostly used in developed countries, as well as 
in many less developed countries and recently in Eastern European 
countries. 
 
During 1992 and 1993 the National Bank of Croatia (NBC) effected 
many changes in types and relative role of its monetary policy 
instruments. These changes are very useful and important, but they are 
moderate in comparison with modifications of instruments which have 
been recently made in other countries similar to Croatia. Direct controls 
are stilt major monetary instruments, largely because of exogenous 
factors. 
 
The reform of monetary policy instruments is one of the key elements 
that are necessary for the success of stabilization programs. It is not a 
coincidence that such a reform was performed in many modern 
stabilization programs. The first part of this article shows why direct 
controls must be replaced with market oriented monetary instruments 
and what it means for the conduct of monetary policy. The second part 
surveys principle elements of financial reforms that are already effected 
in other countries. Because recent economic and monetary policies still 
contain some old fallacies, the third part provides the brief 
interpretation of monetary instruments commonly utilized in former 
Yugoslavia. The fourth part examines  the  setting  of  monetary  policy 
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instrument after the introduction of Croatian Dinar.1 The fifth part 
focuses on changes of monetary instruments effected after the October 
1993 stabilization program. Finally, I will conclude the article with 




2. Direct Controls vis-a-vis Market Oriented Monetary 
    Instruments 
 
By setting monetary policy instruments a central bank can affect the 
stock of base money and the value of money multiplier, as well the 
general level of interest rates and exchange rates. Certain monetary 
instruments do not have mutually exclusive, but they may have several 
different simultaneous effects. For example, if a central bank increases 
the reserve requirement, it will result in the reduction of money 
multiplier, the increase of the base money stock, and it will also 
increase the demand for the reserve deposits which, other things being 
equal, creates tendencies to raise interest rates and to appreciate the 
currency. 
 
Any central bank would like to control simultaneously the stock of 
monetary aggregates, general level of interest rates and exchange 
rates. Such central banks' attitudes are understandable because the 
monetary expansion - if it is not in step with trends of economic activity 
and consumption - will result in the demand pull inflation. Moreover, as 
the rise of interest rates and the exchange rate depreciation push up 
costs, it can produce pressures on prices, too. Therefore, in spite of the 
impossibility to control stocks and prices simultaneously, many central 
banks tried to do so, and their efforts often resulted in the use of direct 
controls. 
                                                          
1 The Croatian Dinar replaced the Yugoslav Dinar as means of payment in Croatia 
on 1 January 1992. Afterwards, on 1 June 1994, it was replaced by Kuna. 
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A central bank's desire can be to post interest rates that are lower than 
prevailing market rates, without producing any change in long-term 
trends of monetary aggregates. Such conflicting goals can be met by 
using two following monetary policy instruments: the automatic or 
semiautomatic borrowing facilities to commercial banks at the central 
bank and the ceilings on commercial banks credits.2 Automatic 
borrowing facilities ensure posted interest rates, but they also seriously 
undermine the central bank's ability to control the stock of base money. 
In spite of that, the central bank protects its control of monetary 
aggregates by setting ceilings on commercial banks' credits. 
 
When there are automatic borrowing facilities, the setting of interest 
rates can be described in the following way: since central bank credits 
are always freely available to banks at administered rates, central bank 
credit rate (which in practice can be called differently, for example, a 
discount rate or a prime rate) becomes the marginal price that 
commercial banks must pay to raise deposits. Accordingly, the central 
bank credit rate becomes the highest deposit rate in the banking 
system. Commercial banks credit rates are set by adding spreads to 
their deposit rates. Every bank will try to maximize its spread. In the 
banking system, the value of spreads will depend on competitiveness 
on the interbank market and other markets as well. 
 
Similar logic can be used to explain the setting of exchange rates. The 
central bank can, provided that it has sufficient international reserves, 
fix the exchange rate, when it stands ready to accept every supplied or 
demanded quantity of foreign exchange at the central bank exchange 
rate. However, by fixing the exchange rate the central bank will loose 
the control of one of base money components. Therefore the control of 
monetary aggregates will be achieved either by sterilizing the effects of 
foreign exchange operations of the central bank or by setting ceilings 
on   commercial   banks   credits.   If   the  central  bank  sterilizes  the 
                                                          
2 The ceiling on commercial banks' credits is the maximum amount of credits that 
can be granted by commercial banks. Ceilings are always set on bank-by-bank 
basis. The overall ceiling is the sum of banks' specific ceilings. 
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base money creation resulting from its foreign exchange operations, it 
will actually control the base money stock. It will also control monetary 
aggregates, because they are related to the base money through the 
money multiplier. On the other hand, if the central bank sets ceilings on 
commercial banks credits instead of sterilization, it will give up the 
control of base money stock, but will directly control the net domestic 
assets of the banking system. The control of net domestic assets 
ensures the stability of the balance of payments and the protection of 
international reserves. Without such control international reserves could 
be exhausted and the balance of payments problem could emerge. 
Such situation in the balance of payments usually results in the 
exchange rate depreciation as well.3 
 
Posted interest rates have many negative effects. Interest rates that 
are lower than market rates should be result in the non-price allocation 
of credit and lower savings rates. Non-price allocation of credit may, in 
particular when banks are under direct government control, create a 
tendency that banks prefer projects of lower profitability to those of 
higher profitability. Banks also favor projects with lower risk, compared 
to projects involving higher risk but also the higher profitability. The 
approval of projects whose general feature is lower profitability leads 
also to the lower savings rate. This, in turn, leads to the lower growth 
rate for the economy as a whole. 
 
Interest rates and exchange rates are set by market forces in modern 
market economies. Nevertheless, central banks have significant 
influence on interest rates and exchange rates. Their monetary policies 
are usually described as having one of three possible orientations. 
When there is neutral stance of monetary policy, the central bank 
actions offset the demand for reserve deposits, and interest rates and 
exchange rates are set solely by market forces. When there is 
expansionary   stance   of  monetary  policy,  the  central  bank  actions 
                                                          
3 This explication is based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments 
which originates from David Hume. There is extensive literature on this approach. 
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create the excess supply of reserve deposits, which creates tendency 
for the reduction of interest rates and the exchange rate depreciation. 
Finally, when there is restrictive monetary policy, the central bank 
actions create the excess demand for reserve deposits, which leads to 
the rise of interest rates and the exchange rate appreciation. 
Accordingly, in modern market economies the central banks' control of 
the base money stock depends on the base money influence on interest 
rates and exchange rates.4 The decision on the stance of monetary 
policy is based on the final goals the central bank wants to achieve. 
 
It is often in the small open market economies that the exchange rate 
is pegged to the currencies of their leading trade partners. Pegging the 
exchange rate reduces foreign currency risks, but it also reduces the 
room for the conduct of monetary policy. As in the case of fixed 
exchange rates, monetary policy actions affect only domestic interest 
rates, and the exchange rates are set according to the given rule. 
However, when domestic interest rates are set according to the world 
interest rates, monetary policy is entirely inefficient.5 
 
 
3. Reforms of Monetary Policy Instruments 
 
In developed financial systems there are well developed secondary 
securities markets and interbank markets. The main procedure of 
controlling domestic  liquidity  involves  central  banks  interventions  at  
                                                          
4 To say that the central bank controls the base money stock is the same as to say 
that the central bank controls the reserve deposits stock. These aggregates defer 
only for the currency in circulation, and the demand for the currency in circulation 
is always met. 
 
5 Such case was first explained by R.A.Mundell in the article "Capital mobility and 
stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rate (1968). 
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interbank markets.6 In some countries, central banks also intervene at 
other financial markets. Interventions, either at interbank markets or at 
other financial markets, are also called open market operations. 
 
The development of financial markets was a long process in developed 
countries. Therefore many less developed countries and Eastern 
European countries decided not to wait passively for spontaneous and 
probably delayed development of financial markets. They passed and 
implemented financial reforms, whose purpose was to build competitive 
financial markets and appropriate institutions. There are numerous 
positive examples of undertaken financial reforms.7 
 
Reforms of monetary policy instruments are usually based on the 
elimination of commercial banks credit ceilings, the abolishment of 
central bank automatic borrowing facilities, the establishment of the 
primary market for government or central bank bills, the introducing of 
repurchase agreements in these bills, and the reforming of central bank 
liquidity credits. Monetary policy instruments that are also commonly 
used are reserve requirements, central bank interventions at the 
foreign exchange market, and, sometimes, the management of 
government deposits. 
 
The use of commercial banks credit ceilings will become unnecessary, 
once the central bank has decided to control the stock of base money. 
 
                                                          
6 Interventions are the common name for central bank auctions. There are different 
auction techniques. The choice of technique depends on goals and targets of 
monetary policy, types of financial instruments that are being auctioned, and the 
development of interbank market. In fact, there are three main types of auctions: 
(1) free auctions, where the quantity to be traded is announced in advance and the 
price is derived from competitive bids (offers), (2) fixed price tenders, where the 
price is announced in advance and the traded quantity is whatever the demand is, 
and (3) mixed auctions, which are combinations of above two techniques (for 
example, where the quantity to be traded and the range of acceptable prices are 
announced in advance). 
 
7 In particular, see about it in R.B.Johnston i Odd Per Brekk (1989). 
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However, the central bank will be able to control the base money stock 
only if it eliminates its automatic borrowing facilities. 
 
The elimination of automatic borrowing facilities is also a precondition 
for the development of interbank market and other financial markets. 
Namely, when banks are allowed to borrow automatically from the 
central bank, they do not have any incentives to cover their cash 
deficits from sources other than the central bank. On the other hand, 
when central bank money is not easily available, and borrowing from 
the central bank is regarded as unfavorable, the banks will tend to 
cover their cash deficits by borrowing at interbank market or in other 
financial markets. 
 
The main purpose of creating the primary securities market is to 
introduce safe and liquid financial instruments, and fiscal considerations 
are not relevant.8 Therefore there is no major difference between 
initiating the primary market for government securities or the primary 
market for central bank securities.9 However, there are some practical 
differences between these securities, which give advantage to the 
central bank securities. Namely, when securities are issued by the 
government, their types and volumes are usually tailored according to 
the fiscal needs. In case of central bank securities, the central bank can 
arrange their types and volumes of issue corresponding to goals and 
targets of monetary policy. More, the task of organizing the primary 
market for central bank securities represents the exclusive responsibility 
of the central bank. 
                                                          
8 The techniques of financing can not solve the budget deficit problem. 
Nevertheless, the budget deficit always has the impact on prices, interest rates and 
exchange rates. 
 
9 If securities are issued by the government, the government budget will be directly 
affected by the net costs of issue. If securities are issued by the central bank, the 
central bank profit will be reduced, and the government budget will be affected 
indirectly. 
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Repurchase agreements in securities are used to smooth daily and 
seasonal variations of banks' liquidity. Liquidity management reduces 
the volatility of interest rates and exchange rates, while stable interest 
rates and exchange rates guarantee that the economy will receive 
appropriate signals. 
 
The volatility of interest and exchange rates results from high daily and 
seasonal variations of reserve deposits. Daily variations of reserve 
deposits may result from changes of currency outside banks and 
changes of government deposits at the central bank. Seasonal 
variations may be due to tourist migrations. From the point of view of 
rational expectations economics, it may be claimed that commercial 
banks will foresee these variations by building proper precautionary 
reserves. However, in addition to daily and seasonal variations, 
monetary trends have the random component. Sudden shocks would 
affect interest rates and exchange rates, and therefore central banks' 
interventions are always necessary. 
 
The main advantage of repurchase agreements in securities is their 
flexibility in terms of being easily adjusted to suit the purposes of the 
central bank. It may be illustrated by two examples. If the central bank 
wants to increase the stock of reserve money for the next ten days, it 
will offer ten days repurchase agreements. If it wants to increase the 
reserve money during the tourist season, it will offer repurchase 
agreement with the longer maturity. 
 
In addition to repurchase agreements, central banks have developed 
other instruments for banks' liquidity management. Firstly, lagged 
reserve requirements have been replaced by the contemporaneous 
reserve requirements. The latter type of requirement permits banks to 
have the occasional end of day reserve deficiencies, and banks must 
meet their requirements during the prescribed time interval. Secondly, 
in some countries like Canada the management of government deposits 
is also used as the monetary policy instrument. Government deposits 
are in principle kept with the central bank, so they reduce banks' 
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liquidity. Accordingly, the central bank can intervene by making short-
term transfers of these deposits to and from the commercial banks. 
Finally, one of the main factors which supports the stability of interest 
rates and exchange rates is the possibility to forecast the bank's 
liquidity. Such forecasts are very much based on the future payment 
flows. In modern payment systems the large value payment orders10 
are processed during the same day and all other payment orders next 
day, so banks can easily project their liquidity position for the next 
business day. 
 
In order to help the banking system to cope with sudden shocks, 
liquidity credits are also present in the set of new monetary policy 
instruments. The central bank grants such credits on the basis of bank's 
request, but frequent borrowing will induce the central bank to send its 
inspectors to the commercial bank. Liquidity credits are frequently; but 
not always, under quantitative ceilings and they are usually backed with 
securities. They are also the only channel of base money creation 
where the initiative comes from commercial banks. 
 
The purpose of reforms of monetary policy instruments is to develop 
competitive financial markets. In the first step the interbank market is 
formed. It is expected that its development will positively affect the 
evolution of other financial markets. In passing it may be noted that 
reforms of monetary policy instruments are processes which may 
involve some problems. In particular, in oligopolistic banking markets 
there is a danger that administered regulations are replaced by 
inefficient market structures. Each financial reform must take this into 
the account, and the phasing of reform must depend on real situation.11  
                                                          
10 Large value payment orders result from trade at fhe interbank market and other 
financial markets. 
11 After developing interbank market, interest rates should adjust fo the inierbank 
race. If, for some reason, this did not happen, central bank should react. In the 
extreme case, the central bank could respond by directly influencing the behavior of 
management of the largest banks However, it could be more practical that, in 
addition to commercial banks, the central bank offered securities to nonbank 
sectors. By doing this, fhe central would directly compete with banks for raising 
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4. Instruments of Monetary Policy in Retrospect 
 
Some lessons can be derived from the monetary policy procedures that 
were commonly used during the communist rule in the former 
Yugoslavia. Than the central bank did not control the stock of base 
money, and it controlled the broad money by setting ceilings for 
commercial banks credits. Interest rates were low and mostly negative 
in real terms. Moreover, during the second half of 1980s, there was a 
policy of fixed real exchange rate, i.e. the currency was pegged to the 
difference between domestic and foreign inflation. At the end of 1980s, 
there were some efforts to reform monetary policy instruments. The 
emerging political crisis halted those reforms. 
 
The central bank could not control the stock of base money, because it 
did not control either its foreign exchange operations or its credit 
activities. The main monetary control instrument were commercial 
banks credit ceilings. Such instrument was perpetually enforced from 
1978 to 1988. The endless use of ceilings resulted in the downward 
trend of the value of money multiplier in 1980s.12 
 
During the second half of 1980s, excluding a few short exceptional 
intervals, there was a policy of fixed real exchange rate. The currency 
was nonconvertible, so the black foreign exchange market existed 
parallel with the official market. The spread on the black foreign 
exchange market was stable.13 The stability of spread indicates that the 
central bank did not control its foreign exchange operations, and in fact  
                                                                                                                                      
deposits. Further, the same tactics could be applied for solving oligopolistic 
problems on foreign exchange market. 
 
12 The detailed analysis of money multiplier and monetary developments in former 
Yugoslavia is provided in R. Martić (1989). 
 
13 However, when there were sporadic deviations from fixed real exchange rate 
policy, the spread increased. 
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it regulated the exchange rate.14 
 
Refinancing of banks was based on documentary credits. Such credits 
were granted, once banks - by the delivery of certain documents -
proved that they had already granted credits to final users for 
earmarked purposes. Thanks to such arrangement, banks were always 
highly liquid, and documentary credits were crowding other credits out 
of their portfolio. Further, the central bank charged its discount rate for 
documentary credits. This rate was considered to be the chief interest 
rate in the banking system, but it was not always the case. 
 
Namely, whenever the central bank adopted the restrictive monetary 
targets, commercial banks credit ceilings became inefficient in 
controlling interest rates. On such occasions the shortage of banks' 
credits increased trade at the inter-enterprise money market. Interest 
rates at this market were higher than the banks' rates and they were 
negatively correlated to the tightness of monetary policy. Over time the 
inter-enterprise money market became the significant competitive 
challenge to commercial banks. Therefore, banks had to respond by 
raising their interest rates, and it was the end of the relation between 
the central bank discount rate and the banks' rates.15 
 
Commercial banks always remained superior to the inter-enterprise 
money market. Monetary policy stance was mostly expansionary and 
the inflation was increasing. Inflationary policies always managed to 
restore the relationship between  the  central  bank  discount  rate  and 
 
                                                          
14 In practice, there was also the switching of supply and demand flows from black 
io official foreign exchange market and conversely. Switching resulted either from 
legal changes or misinvoicing. 
 
15 In the first step banks raised their deposit rates, so they were higher than their 
credit rates. Such banks' policies partly resulted from the special regulation, which 
was enforced by the central bank. Namely, the central bank prescribed the 
maximum value of credit rates that banks could charge on documentary credits. 
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interest rates in the economy as a whole. Moreover, at the beginning of 
1987 this relation was even put in legal form. Than the overall 
indexation of assets and liabilities was adopted, and the central bank 
discount rate was defined as one of the indexation rates. 
 
At the beginning of 1989 commercial banks ceilings were replaced by 
ceilings on the central bank documentary credits. The exchange rate 
was fixed in real terms. Therefore, if the central bank had intended to 
control the base money stock, the value of its credit ceiling would have 
been consistent with the value of its foreign exchange operations. 
Otherwise, other sterilizing monetary instruments had to be used. 
 
In the same period there was a suficit of the current account in the 
balance of payments, so the central bank tried to sterilize the base 
money creation, arising from its foreign exchange operations, by 
reducing its documentary credits to banks. However, such tactics did 
not work. Banks complained against reducing their borrowing from the 
central bank, because they were not able to collect documentary credits 
granted to the final users. Further, the policy did not suit the traditional 
priority sectors, so it created the adverse political climate. Political 
requests to increase the central bank documentary credits were rather 
frequent. Because of its low independence, the central bank always 
positively responded to such requests. Afterwards it usually tried to 
restore the control of money supply by raising the reserve 
requirements. However, this was not sufficient. Over time, the 
monetary policy became highly expansionary, which resulted in the 
exponential trend of inflation. 
 
When ceilings on the central bank documentary credits were the main 
monetary policy instrument, the stance of monetary policy varied 
between two extremes: firstly, monetary policy was foremost highly 
expansionary, and secondly, there were some efforts, which lived very 
shortly, to stop the inflation by suddenly reducing the monetary growth. 
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During highly expansionary monetary policies, ceilings on central bank 
documentary credits were formally enforced, but they were only the 
loose constraint for the commercial banks' activities. The expansion of 
money and credit was guaranteed by the really negative central bank 
discount rate. This rate became the leading price of banks' marginal 
sources of funds. Therefore, all interest rates adjusted to the central 
bank discount rate. More, the discount rate became the lowest interest 
rate in the economy as a whole, and any rise of the discount rate was 
followed by the increases of other interest rates. 
 
Episodes of restrictive monetary policy were based on the sterilization 
of central bank foreign exchange operations by either reducing the 
central bank documentary credits or by raising the reserve 
requirements.16 The central bank always reduced its discount rate, too. 
A lowering of the discount rate was based on two beliefs: firstly, it was 
thought that all other interest rates would also fall and secondly, it was 
considered that after inflation gradually decreased the discount rate 
would become really positive. These beliefs never came true. Due to 
the changed monetary policy stance, the lowering of the discount rate 
always resulted in the growth of the general level of interest rates. 
 
The restrictive stance of monetary policy also resulted in the explosion 
of liquidity crisis. Such course of events should have been foreseen. 
Namely, the continuous use of documentary credits and the policy of 
really negative interest rates favored low, or even negative, profitability 
projects for many years. The enterprises also hedged themselves 
against inflation by minimizing their cash holdings. Therefore, after 
changing the stance of monetary policy, it became apparent that many 
banks were insolvent, and many enterprises were loss making. The 
central bank would soon return to inflationary policies. Without the 
comprehensive economic program, it was impossible to control the 
stock of base money for a time. 
 
                                                          
16 In addition, foreign borrowing was frequently limited. 
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5. Monetary Control Procedures in Croatia from  
    January 1992 to September 1993 
 
After the introduction of Croatian Dinar, monetary policy had conflicting 
goals. The central bank intended to control the money supply and to 
post interest rates and exchange rates simultaneously.17 It was 
impossible to attain such goals. Therefore, the monetary policy, as in 
former Yugoslavia, was characterized by "go and stop" policies. 
 
In order to solve the problem of banks' insolvency, in 1991 the Croatian 
government effected two large rescheduling operations. Firstly, the 
government granted long term bonds to designated enterprises, and 
the banks were required to accept these bonds as the repayment of 
enterprises debt (these bonds are called Big bonds).18 Secondly, the 
government swapped banks' claims against the National Bank of 
Yugoslavia arising from households foreign currency deposits into the 
banks' claims on itself.19 As a result of these operations, the Croatian 
government has become the largest banks' debtor. However, 
rescheduling operations did not solve problems of banks' insolvency. 
The government never met its obligations to banks on time, and it 
often did not pay anything in cash.20  Problems  were further enhanced 
                                                          
17 There were other goals, too. One of the major goals was building up international 
reserves. 
 
18 The Big bonds operation can also be treated as the recapitalization of 
enterprises. Namely, under the Privatization law all socially-owned enterprises were 
later transformed into the joint stock companies. If the enterprise previously 
received the Big bonds, the government would receive the larger share in the 
transformed enterprise. 
 
19 The government also blocked households foreign currency deposits for a few 
years. 
 
20 Formally, banks are solvent, and according to prudential criteria set by the 
National Bank of Croatia they are among the best in the world. Such funny results 
are due to the fact that about 50 percent of total banks' assets are claims against 
government. These claims are considered to be more worthy than, for example, US 
Treasury bills. 
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by the large government arrears to enterprises. Moreover, some banks 
and enterprises were severely affected by the war. Because of all these 
reasons, there was a permanent danger of new liquidity crises. Such 
developments created enough room for "go and stop" monetary 
policies. 
 
The National bank of Croatia inherited monetary control procedures 
from the former central bank, but it also introduced many changes. 
Direct controls remained its main monetary instruments, largely 
because of the huge public sector deficit which seriously reduced the 
room for potential reforms. 
 
Non-sterilized foreign exchange operations were the main channel of 
base money creation. The currency was not convertible, and the central 
bank was always willing to buy foreign exchange from commercial 
banks at its exchange rate. Commercial banks operating reserves were 
continuously increasing, so they were also encouraged to sell foreign 
exchange to the central bank. At the beginning, their exchange rates 
were higher than the central bank exchange rate, so the central bank 
requested banks to apply the central bank exchange rate in all 
transactions. As a result of this request, banks' exchange rates started 
to converge to the central bank exchange rate, and multiple exchange 
rates eventually disappeared in summer 1993. So, the central bank 
successfully posted its exchange rate to the economy as a whole by 
using non-sterilized foreign exchange operations. Once it started to 
sterilize this channel of money creation, as it happened during the 
shock stabilization, market exchange rates again diverged from the 
central bank rate. 
 
The central bank determination to build up its international reserves 
permitted the adoption of internal convertibility for current account 
transactions in October 1993. However, it may be noted that the 
central bank international reserves are equal to the sum of banks and 
enterprises external arrears. If there had been no unilaterally declared 
 136
moratorium on foreign debt, the money creation arising from central 
bank foreign exchange operations would have been much smaller. 
 
There were two types of central bank credits granted to banks: 
documentary credits and liquidity credits. Except in the first quarter of 
1992, documentary credits were always subject to ceilings. Namely, in 
1992 the portfolio of central bank documentary credits was divided into 
two quotas. These were the so called general quota and selective 
quota.21 At the beginning of 1993, these quotas were merged into the 
so called uniform general quota. Then the central bank formally 
stopped granting new documentary credits, i.e. all credits granted 
within the uniform general quota were simply the unsecured book 
credits.22 Further, as foreign exchange operations were non-sterilized, 
the central bank gradually reduced the real value, and later also the 
nominal value, of uniform general quota. By such tactics, the central 
bank largely reduced the government control of banks' credit policies. 
 
The central bank also tried to sterilize its foreign exchange operations 
by increasing reserve requirements. Banks were subject to three types 
of lagged reserve requirements: required reserves, obligatory NBC bills 
and required minimum liquidity. Required reserves are banks' assets 
that must be kept in the statutory reserve accounts at the NBC. 
Obligatory NBC bills are banks' assets that must be held in the form of 
NBC bills. Required minimum liquidity are bank's assets that must be 
held in giro accounts at the NBC, in the form of cash or partly in NBC 
bills. As of May 1993 the first two requirements were merged into the 
required reserves. 
                                                          
21 The selective quota was exclusively reserved for documentary credits. The credits 
within the general quota had to be partly backed with securities. However, as most 
of these securities were without any market value, the majority of credits granted 
within general quota were in fact documentary credits. 
 
22 Later in 1993, the central bank also effected the special type of banks' 
refinancing called advance credits to banks. Advance credits were granted only to 
banks' buying foreign bank notes and travellers checks, and they were repaid after 
summer tourist season. Needless to say that these credits were in fact documentary 
credits. 
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The NBC discount rate was negative in real terms.23 When the 
monetary policy was expansionary, commercial banks interest rates 
were set according to the NBC discount rate. However, when the NBC 
tried to launch the restrictive monetary policy by reducing the monetary 
growth and its discount rate, commercial banks interest rates were not 
adjusted in line with the reductions of the NBC discount rate. The 
interest rates at the inter-enterprise money markets also had the 
separate trend. Further, as the inflation did not decrease, the nominal 
reductions of the NBC discount rate resulted in its fall in real terms, too. 
 
Shortly lived efforts to achieve the restrictive stance of monetary policy 
were also characterized by banks' liquidity problems. Banks illiquidity 
always produced the substantial base money creation arising from the 
NBC liquidity facilities. These facilities include: liquidity credits, special 
liquidity credits, the use of required reserves, noncompliance with the 
required reserves, noncompliance with the required minimum liquidity, 
the end-of-day negative balances in banks' giro accounts at the NBC, 
overnight interbank credits arranged through the Money Market 
Zagreb24 and banks' arrears to the NBC. 
                                                          
23 Because of high inflation, the NBC exchange rate nominally depreciated almost 
every day. Nominal monthly depreciation rate was equal or nearly equal to the NBC 
discount rate. Therefore, the NBC exchange rate significantly appreciated. 
 
24 As banks' daily payments float is unlimited, overnight interbank lending is nearly 
without any risk. However, when such lending is organized by the brokerage 
institution called The Money Market Zagreb, there is no risk at all. This broker was 
empowered by the NBC to arrange overnight interbank lending under prescribed 
criteria. Namely, after the closing of business day The Money Market Zagreb 
receives data on the end-of-day balances of banks' reserves deposits with the NBC. 
By using this information, the Money Market Zagreb informs banks with excess 
liquidity on the possibility of granting credits to banks, which are short of liquidity. 
As of December 1993 the lending bank is required to charge the NBC discount rate 
for such overnight interbank credits. 
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The NBC formally approved on case-by-base basis only liquidity credits 
and special liquidity credits, and it permitted banks to draw on other 
types of liquidity facilities automatically. Therefore, liquidity facilities 
were never under the NBC control. They were only passively registered 
by the NBC.25 Further, most of the NBC credits arising from its liquidity 
facilities were not properly recorded in its books (see downward table 
which summarizes basic elements of regulations on liquidity facilities). 
 
 
                                                          
25 This results from the fact that the concept of "final settlement" is not precisely 
defined in the Croatian payment system. Namely, the system of domestic payments 
is organized on gross basis, and it is managed by the special government agency. 
Each institution presents its payment orders to the agency. The payment orders are 
transmitted even when there are no sufficient balances in the sending bank's 
reserve account at the NBC. In such cases, the NBC automatically grants the credit 
to the sending bank. 
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The NBC tried to restrain the use of liquidity facilities without 
undertaking their radical change. As increasing interest rates did not fit 
the popular belief about the central bank rate sending signals for the 
setting of other interest rates in the economy, the interest rates were 
never used as means for reducing the use of liquidity facilities. 
Therefore, the NBC tried to tighten regulations on their use. 
Traditionally, when the bank used the liquidity facilities, the NBC set a 
ceiling for the bank's credits. With most of liquidity facilities, the ceiling 
was gradually replaced by the blockade of bank's reserve account with 
the NBC.26 Nevertheless, the tightening of regulations proved to be 
inefficient, and it resulted in invention of new mechanisms of non-
compliance with these limits. 
 
The most famous invention was to go around the blockade of bank's 
giro account with the NBC. Such blockade seemed to be a very rigorous 
regulation, but in fact it did not do anything. As the NBC was 
responsible only for banks, banks went around the blockade by 
establishing their daughter companies which were not subject to the 
NBC control. Then they simply transferred business to its daughter 
companies. As a result, banks drew heavily on the NBC liquidity 
facilities, and they continued to operate like there was no blockade at 
all. 
 
When the NBC tried to implement the restrictive monetary policy, the 
same banks were always acting as leaders in creating inventions. They 
drew heavily on the liquidity facilities, and they rapidly increased their 
borrowing from the NBC. It is not precisely known whether these banks 
are truly the largest failures among banks - or whether this happened 
because they have been heavily burdened with government bonds or 
severely affected by the war - or whether this was only their tactics. 
 
                                                          
26 The blockade refers only to payment orders, which are presented by the sending 
bank itself to the agency that manages domestic payments. It does not refer to 
payment orders, which are presented by the sending banks depositors. 
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However, such developments forced the NBC to choose between higher 
monetary growth and penalizing other banks. 
 
 
6. Changes of Monetary Policy Instruments from October 1993 
to Onwards 
 
Since the shock stabilization implemented in October 1993 the NBC has 
been using some market oriented monetary instruments. It has also 
introduced some elements of banks' liquidity management in its 
practices. Major changes of monetary instruments were interventions at 
the foreign exchange market and the marketing of the NBC bills. There 
were also some changes in the NBC interest rate and reserve 
requirement policies. On the other hand, as its liquidity facilities were 
left unchanged, banks can still automatically borrow from the NBC. 
 
The first NBC interventions at the foreign exchange market were 
recorded in November 1993. Than there was the beginning of shock 
stabilization, so the NBC wanted to achieve highly restrictive monetary 
policy and it was very concerned with its base money target. Moreover, 
there was the banks' liquidity crisis, the interest rates were in fact 
limited by the Government decree on taxing excessive interest rates,27 
and the market exchange rate was rapidly appreciating. Under such 
circumstances, the NBC offered banks to buy foreign exchange from 
them by using the free auction's procedure (the tender volumes were 
not announced). The introduction of such auctions at the foreign 
exchange market had two main effects. Firstly, as the room for 
interventions was very limited, there was no precise effect on the 
exchange rate, which continued to appreciate. Secondly, as 
administered increases of monetary base were replaced by free 
auctions,   there   was  a  big  shift  in  distribution  of  liquidity  among 
 
                                                          
27 The NBC interest rates were exempted from the regulation. Moreover, the NBC, 
for the first time, also set its interest rates charged on the liquidity facilities at 
tremendously high level. 
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commercial banks. Therefore, large banks in particular started to 
complain against free auctions. 
 
In order to stop the exchange rate appreciation and to affect the 
distribution of monetary base among banks, in December 1993 the NBC 
changed its auction procedures. From December 1993 to January 1994 
the NBC formally continued with free auctions, but it always announced 
the minimum acceptable exchange rates in advance. The problem was 
that the announced rates were always higher than the market 
exchange rates. As a result, banks always offered the minimum 
announced rates, and the NBC had to exercise its discretion in 
accepting their offers. Further, tremendous spreads at the foreign 
exchange market again occurred. Banks used the NBC announced rate 
only for the operations with the NBC and households, and the lower 
market exchange rates were used for the other types of banking 
business. Therefore, in February 1994 the NBC again changed its 
auction procedures by adding an announcement of the maximum 
acceptable value of a singe bid.28 As it did not help, at the beginning of 
March 1994 the NBC introduced the new system of its foreign exchange 
operations, which was a supplement to its auctions. Under the new 
system the NBC bought foreign exchange from banks at the NBC 
exchange rate depending on the value of receipts at bank's foreign 
exchange offices. The new system of foreign exchange operations was 
the main channel of base money creation from March to September 
1994, and auctions were rather rare.29 After it was introduced, spreads 
at the foreign exchange market nearly disappeared, and the NBC again 
posted its exchange rate to banks. 
                                                          
28 This quantity depended on the bank's foreign currency exposure. Therefore it 
was not same for each bank. 
 
29 As of March 1994 the NBC also offered banks repurchase agreements in foreign 
exchange. The maturity of such agreements was mainly until the end of current 
month. The selling technique varied from the NBC discretion to the combination of 
auctions and the NBC discretion. 
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The main monetary instrument used to neutralize the NBC foreign 
exchange operations was the issue of NBC bills. Until November 1993 
the NBC bills were sold on tap, and the interest rate on them was set 
very low. Therefore, the demand for NBC bills was insignificant. 
However, in December 1993 the NBC started to organize the primary 
market for the NBC bills. The selling technique for bills was the 
combination of free auctions and the NBC discretion. In particular at 
initial stages, tenders nearly always failed because there were many 
difficulties with the selling technique. Firstly, since the NBC, at each 
auction, offered banks bills with the range of maturities, there was 
often the only one bid for the particular type of bill. Secondly, since the 
interest rate bids were designed as spreads on the NBC discount rate, 
the accepted interest rate was subject to the discount rate risk. Thirdly, 
as the relatively long period of time - almost two days - was needed to 
complete the sale of bills, banks were burdened with large opportunity 
costs. In addition to these technical problems, the NBC never 
announced the tender volume, i.e. it always exercised its discretion at 
accepting volume. In that way the NBC wanted to avoid possible 
excessive interest rate volatility. 
 
After a few months of learning, the selling technique of the NBC bills 
was gradually improved. However, the major change in the issue of 
bills came in March 1994, parallel with introducing the new system of 
the NBC foreign exchange operations. Than the NBC decided to accept 
interest rates that were in line with the interest rates at the inter-
enterprise money market. After such decision it was not a problem to 
market the NBC bills, and it was also possible to neutralize the NBC 
foreign exchange operations. Nevertheless, the issue of bills was a very 
costly business for the NBC, and bills rate became the highest among 
its interest rates. 
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Interest rates, excluding the NBC rates, were effectively limited by the 
special government decree on taxing excessive interest rates.30 The 
regulation was not effective in all financial markets. In particular it was 
avoided on the inter-enterprise markets, where borrowers had to pay 
untypically high charges or they honored fictitious invoices. After adding 
these additional costs of the use of credit to the interest, interest rates 
would be several times higher. The NBC adapted to the situation by 
changing the structure of its interest rates. Firstly, the discount rate 
was formally left as the NBC main credit rate, and it was set in 
accordance with the government decree. As the prices were stable, the 
discount rate was positive in real terms, but it was much lower that the 
market rates. Moreover, the NBC granted the small amount of new 
credits, i.e. it granted only advance credits (and it repaid credits within 
the general quota). Secondly, in particular at the initial stages of shock 
stabilization, interest rates on liquidity facilities were set very high. As a 
result, most banks were compliant with the NBC regulations, and only a 
few banks continuously and heavily drew on the NBC liquidity facilities. 
Thirdly, as it was mentioned above, the NBC accepted the market rate 
as the rate for the NBC bills. 
The NBC has also changed the regulations on required reserves very 
actively. Prior to October 1993 the different reserves rates applied to 
demand deposits, including time deposits with maturity of within three 
months, and time deposits with maturity of more than three months. 
These rates were unified in October 1993, and different rates were 
again set in March 1994. Further,  as of October 1993 banks'  obligation 
                                                          
30 It may be questioned why the government enforced such decree. The common 
explanation is that enterprises believe that they still operate under the soft budget 
constraint and the non-price credit rationing, so they are only concerned with the 
availability of credit. In my opinion, this statement may be correct for some 
enterprises, but it is generally wrong. There were many discussions on lifting the 
regulation, but some large banks supported it. Therefore, I think that the decree 
basically serves as means of protecting large banks. These banks are the largest 
borrowers at the interbank market, and their assets are mostly long-term 
government bonds. Accordingly, by lobbying for the decree they protected their 
profits. 
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to meet their required reserves at the end of day was replaced by the 
obligation to meet them at every moment of time (from December 
1993 overnight interbank credits arranged through the Money Market 
Zagreb have been exempted from this regulation). Moreover, as of the 
middle of January 1994 the NBC limited the use of required reserves to 
50 percent. Finally, as of March 1994 it started to pay the interest on 
banks' required reserves. In 1994 there were also a few increases in 
the NBC reserves rates. The required reserves were chiefly used as a 
means for achieving monetary objectives. 
 
 
7. Proposals for the Reform of Monetary Policy Instruments in 
Croatia 
 
Administered interest rates existed in Croatia for many years. Such 
interest rates were posted by the inflationary economic and monetary 
policy. Further, they were set according to the central bank discount 
rate, which was usually negative in real terms. 
 
 
When the shock stabilization was enforced in October 1993, the NBC 
significantly reduced its discount rate and the Croatian government set 
the ceiling on interest rates by introducing prohibitive taxes on them. 
However, as monetary policy was changed, interest rates at the inter-
enterprise markets did not follow the same trend. Such developments 
were normal. There were a few reasons why we could expect turbulent 
interest rate trends and, at least at the beginning of shock stabilization, 
the rise of real interest rates. Firstly, in early stages inflationary 
expectations might still exist and the creditworthness of the program 
was low. Secondly, disinflation brought about the liquidity crisis. 
Thirdly, banks' credits are mainly assets of low liquidity and the 
government was not making timely payments in particular to banks. 
Finally, financial markets were undeveloped. 
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The interest rate ceiling repressed the development of financial 
markets. These markets remained segmented and undeveloped, and 
the possibility to avoid the ceiling was the main factor affecting the 
volume of trading on them. Further, the ceiling had two other important 
results. Firstly, the NBC discount rate was not the base interest rate in 
the economy anymore. As the inter-enterprise rates had independent 
trends, the discount rate was not giving signals to the economy at all. 
Secondly, the NBC profits were wiped out, so the government indirectly 
incurred large losses. Namely, the NBC created monetary base mostly 
through its foreign exchange operations, and, on the other hand, it 
neutralized base money creation by issuing NBC bills and repaying its 
credit portfolio. As a result, the NBC assets consist mostly of 
international reserves which bear the world interest, and the large part 
of its liabilities are NBC bills, which are sold at much higher interest 
rates that exist at the domestic inter-enterprise money market. 
 
In such circumstances, there is really a great need to push the 
development of financial markets. The government should lift the 
decree on taxing excessive interest rates.31 However, the major tasks 
are those to be undertaken by the NBC. This institution should become 
the locomotive of financial markets development. 
 
The NBC has made important efforts in reforming its monetary policy 
instruments, but all this is far less than needed. The reforms must start 
from lifting the existing liquidity facilities that permit automatic use of 
the NBC credits. It is also necessary to enforce the final settlement. 
These two changes are preconditions for implementing any serious 
financial reform. They can also prevent existing mechanisms for 
avoiding regulations. 
 
The NBC bills can be used as the instrument for developing the 
interbank market. For the time being, there is only the primary market 
in the NBC bills. After some trials and errors at early stages, the selling 
                                                          
31 The government lifted the decree in September 1994. 
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technique of bills has been largely improved, but is still closer to the 
discretion than to auctions. As commercial banks could always borrow 
from the NBC by using its liquidity facilities, it was probably very 
difficult to do more. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why the NBC, 
after reducing the NBC bills to several offered maturities, never tried to 
offer repurchase agreements in the NBC bills. 
 
By leaving the liquidity facilities unchanged, the NBC also left the 
initiative in hands of commercial banks. Therefore, there were no major 
changes in the NBC liquidity management. However, in addition to the 
repurchase agreements in the NBC bills, the NBC could easily enforce 
other changes which would largely improve the liquidity management. 
In particular the payment system could be reformed. Nowadays all 
payment orders are processed on the same day basis. Instead of that, 
payment orders, which arise from the transactions at the interbank 
market, could be processed on the same day, and all other payment 
orders next day. Such reform is not technically complicated, and banks 
would get adequate information to be able to forecast their liquidity for 
the next day. Furthermore, the central bank would have room to 
intervene, if necessary. 
 
At the same time while lifting the liquidity facilities and changing the 
payment system, the NBC should introduce liquidity credits. These 
credits should be granted whenever a commercial bank becomes 
noncompliant to the NBC, and they should be penalizing for that bank. 
The bank should be primarily penalized by paying higher interest to the 
NBC, i.e. measures like the blockade should avoided. The approval of 
such liquidity credits must be under the NBC discretion. If the bank's 
liquidity position does not improve soon, the NBC should stop granting 
liquidity credits to that bank. Namely, liquidity credits, and other 
instruments of monetary policy as well, serve only to control domestic 
liquidity, and they can not be used for dealing with banks' failures. 
 
The main channel of monetary base creation were the NBC foreign 
exchange operations. It is understandable that the central bank tried to 
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control the exchange rate trends. However, relating the NBC foreign 
exchange operations to the value of receipts at bank's foreign exchange 
offices had nothing common with market oriented procedures. 
Moreover, it was the restoration of administered controls. 
 
Therefore, the NBC should rely only to free auctions, and the excess 
supply at foreign exchange market will vanish (or will be reduced) by 
introducing banks' escrow account with the NBC. Banks should pay 
their maturing liabilities to the rest of the world at this account. Arrears 
will have to be cleared anyway, so it is appropriate to start the creation 
of adequate banks' reserves immediately. Further, introducing banks' 
escrow account with the NBC will have anther important effect. As the 
NBC foreign exchange operations will be reduced, the NBC will have to 
develop other means of creating monetary base. For example, it could 
rediscount bills of exchange. 
 
The NBC interest rates should be set in accordance with interest rates 
at the interbank market. This market will start to develop after lifting 
current liquidity facilities. However, at early stages the NBC should also 
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